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NOTES
THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE TO ANTITRUST
REGULATION OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE
On November 6, 1995, the unspeakable happened. Arthur B.
Modell' announced that he was moving the Cleveland Browns to
Baltimore.2 The fans of Cleveland, who for forty-six years jammed
into cavernous Cleveland Municipal Stadium to cheer on their
beloved Browns, win or lose, were told that through no fault of
their own3 their team was being taken. The resulting outcry forced
the National Football League (NFL) to agree to a deal guaranteeing
that another team would play in Cleveland by 1999.' Los Angeles
and Houston were not fortunate enough to mobilize their fans for
war against the league as Cleveland had done. Fans of the Rams
and Oilers have been abandoned by the NFL despite years of sup-
port.5 This exodus of NFL teams to new cities highlights the in-
1. "In Cleveland, Art Modell is the anti-ChrisL" Paul Daugherty, The Final Battle of
Ohio: Heartbreak by the Lake, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Dec. 17, 1995, Sports, at Bi. This
view is shared by the author. For other references to Modell personifying the anti-Christ,
see John Crumpacker, From Elvis to that Rat Modell, the Heroes and Goats of '95, S.F.
EXAMINER, Dec. 31, 1995, Sports, at D9 ("Pat Modell, wife of Browns owner/anti-Christ
Art .... "); Bud Poliquin, It Was Business, Bottom Line, SYRACUSE HERALD-J., Feb. 9,
1996, Sports, at DI ("Dick MacPherson-who spent three seasons in the employ of
Ohio's very own antichrist . . . -will tell you that Art Modell isn't nearly the creep
he's been portrayed to be.").
2. Timothy Heider, Tom Diemer & Evelyn Theiss, Browns Bolt; Modell Warned
Mayor, Governor a Month Ago; Deal Announced in Baltimore, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve-
land), Nov. 7, 1995, at IA.
3. Steve Rushin, The Heart of a City, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Dec. 4, 1995, at 62
(indicating that the Browns ranked second or third in league attendance 11 times from
1975 to 1994).
4. Stephen Koff, Timothy Heider & Tony Grossi, Cleveland, NFL Strike Deal to
Bring New Team Here, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Feb. 9, 1996, at IA.
5. The Rams, following their departure from Cleveland after the 1945 season, played
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ability of existing NFL regulation to respond to public interest.
Courts' responses to attacks on the NFL have been neither
clear nor in the public's best interest due to the difficulty of apply-
ing antitrust law to the NFL. The NFL has characteristics that
make it a natural monopoly and therefore antitrust law should not
be applied to it. Alternative regulation of the NFL is needed: regu-
lation that serves consumer interests, is easy to apply, and does not
infringe upon the rights of the league members.
This Note is divided into four sections. The first describes the
business of the NFL and why it leads to problems. This is fol-
lowed by an examination of general antitrust law and its historical
application to the NFL, focusing on difficulties involved in apply-
ing it to the NFL. The third section analyzes how the law should
deal with the NFL and concludes that it should be recognized as a
natural monopoly. The final section discusses how the NFL, as a
natural monopoly, should be regulated and what effects such alter-
nate regulation would have.
I. THE NFL
A. The NFL's Business
On August 20, 1920, representatives from four professional
football teams met in Canton, Ohio to organize a league that used
the same rules so they could earn more money from staging foot-
ball games.7 After more meetings, two name changes, two merg-
ers, and seventy-five years, the NFL still endeavors to earn money
from staging football games.' The NFL's ability to earn money
depends upon its power to capture fan interest, which to date has
in Los Angeles for 49 years before bolting to St. Louis. See Mike DiGiovanna & Tracy
Weber, St. Louis Giddily Greets Its New Rams, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 18, 1995, at Al (dis-
cussing the Rams' move to St. Louis). The Oilers, one of the AFL's charter franchises
and winners of its first two championship games, THE 1995 OFFICIAL NATIONAL FOOT-
BALL LEAGUE RECORD AND FACT BOOK 269-77 (1995) [hereinafter NFL R&F BOOK],
have been in Houston since 1960. See Mitchell Landsberg, Music City's Siren Song Lures
Oilers, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Dec. 24, 1995, at 3D (discussing the
Oilers' move to Nashville).
6. This Note focuses on the NFL. The analyses and conclusions discussed may apply
to other sports leagues as well, but several differences between the NFL and other leagues
may prevent uniform application to all sports leagues. These differences include the exis-
tence of minor leagues in hockey and baseball, the NFL's sharing of all television reve-
nue between teams, and Major League Baseball's antitrust exemption.
7. NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 258.
8. For a brief chronology of professional football, see id. at 258-68.
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been awesome? Fan interest translates directly into ticket receipts,
concession and parking receipts, merchandise sales, and television
ratings that result in lucrative television contracts. To maximize
revenue, the NFL acts to maximize fan interest. The manner in
which the NFL maximizes revenue sets it apart from other business
organizations."
The NFL's basic tool for drawing fan interest is the profes-
sional football game. Interest in a single game is increased by
placing it within a season so the impact of the game's result goes
beyond the single contest." The season culminates in playoffs and
an eventual champion, further inducing fan -interest.2 Interest in a
season is enhanced by placing the season within a series of sea-
sons. This allows development of rivalries and player familiarity,
both of which increase fan interest. 3 Further stimulating fan inter-
est are peripherals such as NFL-related merchandise and the Pro
Football Hall of Fame, which would have little value or meaning
outside the context of NFL games, seasons, and series of sea-
sons. 4 Together, the NFL games, seasons, and peripherals com-
bine to generate fan interest that results in revenue.
To maximize interest and thus revenue, the NFL has devel-
oped a unique organizational structure. Member teams both com-
9. In every non-strike year since 1979, over 13 million fans have attended NFL
games each year. Id. at 350. Nine out of the top 10 most-watched sporting events on
television in the United States are all Super Bowls, led by Super Bowl XXVIII (1993),
which had an estimated 134.8 million viewers. Id. at 351.
10. Other sports leagues, which are not specifically considered in this Note, are the
possible exception.
11. The NFL playoff tie-breaking system creates situations in which any one game can
have an impact on a number of other games. NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 13. See
generally id. (discussing the factors used in the tie-breaking system).
12. In 1994, playoff attendance averaged 66,420 fans per game, as compared to 62,659
per game in the regular season. Id. at 227. The Super Bowls, which decide the NFL
championship each year, have been among the most-watched television programs in histo-
ry. Id. at 351.
13. For example, the last time the Cleveland Browns failed to fill Cleveland Municipal
Stadium to near capacity for a game against the Pittsburgh Steelers was in 1983. CLEVE-
LAND BROWNS 1994 FAN AND MEDIA GUIDE 184 (1994) [hereinafter BROWNS MEDIA
GUIDE]. The peak attendance resulted from years of rivalry between the Browns and
Steelers. The final chapter in this great rivalry was a sell out but drew less than capacity
due to the Browns' announced move. The game still had an announced crowd of 55,388,
more than six other games played that day despite the Browns' status. Worth Noting,
BROWNS NEWS/ILLUSTRATED, Nov. 27, 1995, at 8.
14. See Ruth Coxeter & Chris Roush, Meet the NFL's Newest Quarterback, Bus. WK.,
Nov. 7, 1994, at 143 (detailing the plans of the new president of NFL Properties in
running the merchandising arm of the NFL, which will receive royalties on $3 billion in
retail sales of licensed merchandise in 1994).
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pete and cooperate at the same time. Individual teams compete for
resources in the form of players but cooperate in determining rules
of player allocation.15 In limited cases, teams compete for income
in the form of ticket sales, 6 but the major source of league reve-
nue, proceeds from television contracts, is shared. 7 This competi-
tion/cooperation arrangement is necessary to generate fan interest.
Fans want to see the best players competing, so the league must
attract the best players. 8 Fans also want to see competitive con-
15. For example, all teams participate in the annual draft and supplemental drafts.
16. Competition between teams for ticket sales in the NFL is inconsequential because
most cities only enjoy one team. The Los Angeles Rams (before the franchise moved to
St. Louis) and the Los Angeles Raiders (before moving back to Oakland) may have com-
peted for ticket sales when both were playing at home or if consumers decided which
team's season tickets they wanted to purchase. Before leaving, and after returning to,
Oakland, the Raiders may have competed with the San Francisco Forty-Niners. The Wash-
ington Redskins may face some ticket competition from Modell's Baltimore Ravens (the
new name of Modell's team). The only longstanding ticket competition between teams in
close proximity exists in New York. Even in that case, the New York Jets and New
York Giants now compete only for season ticket holders because both teams play home
games in the Meadowlands, thus they cannot both play home games at the same time so
a consumer will not have to pick which game to attend on a given weekend (assuming a
Giants fan would attend a Jets game, and vice versa, which, given the fans of both teams
that the author knows, is not a very plausible assumption).
17. NFL teams share 77% of their revenues, 64% of which come from national televi-
sion. Michael K. Ozanian, Foul Ball, FIN. WORLD, May 25, 1993, at 18, 18.
18. That fans want to see the best players compete against each other is illustrated in
a number of ways. The higher post-season attendance, see supra note 12 (comparing
regular season and playoff attendance), and television ratings in the NFL show that fans
prefer games pitting the best teams against each other. Quality players competing in other
leagues have drawn much higher attendance once they move to the NFL. For example,
Jim Kelly began his career in the USFL, which averaged crowds of 24,500. Gary
Pomerantz, Stars' Saga Enables Shaky USFL to Brag; League Takes Time Out from
Problems, WASH. POST, July 15, 1985, at B2. Within six days of the announcement of
his signing with the NFL's Buffalo Bills, the Bills had to hire 21 additional ticket office
personnel to help sell 6200 season tickets and 38,000 tickets for the 1986 home opener,
giving the Bills their first sell out since 1983. Treasures Amid the USFL's Rubble,
MACLEAN'S, Sept. 29, 1986, at 48, 48-49; Shav Glick, You Wouldn't Exactly Call Jim
Kelly's New Place of Residence the Promised Land, but the Fans Expect Him to Lead
Bills There; He Has Them Buffaloed, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1986, Sports Part 3, at 10.
The demand in college football for a playoff system is based on fans' (and the media's)
desire to see the best players in the country matched up against each other. See Bob
Eger, Who's No. I? Bowls vs. Playoff Debate Continues, ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Dec. 5, 1993,
Final Chaser, at Cl (discussing the demand for a college football playoff system). The
low attendance of the 1987 NFL strike replacement games also shows that the fans' inter-
est is in seeing the best players. See Ira Berkow, Sports of the Times: The Best Were
Invisible, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1987, (Late City Final Edition), at B12. (noting that atten-
dance at strike replacement games averaged 24,453 as compared to 59,686 for the non-
strike games in 1987).
The fact that college teams such as Notre Dame may have a large fan base, even in
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tests, so the league must have player allocation rules that promote
competitive balance. 9 The NFL's organizational structure has
proven successful. It has been this country's premier professional
football league for its entire existence." The NFL's dominance of
professional football has come under attack several times, however.
The attackers could not match the NFL on the gridiron, so they
tried a different playing field-the courtroom.
B. Why the NFL's Business Has Caused Problems
Since the NFL's member teams simultaneously cooperate and
compete, attackers have claimed that this cooperation2' should be
viewed as an illegal restraint of trade as it is in other industries.'
Other attackers have focused on the NFL's dominance, claiming
that the NFL has unlawfully monopolized professional football
because it is the only league that has been successful for a long
period of time.' Each of these attacks is premised on the applica-
tion of antitrust law to the NFL. 24
a losing season, does not undercut this argument because it can be explained by alumni
support. Furthermore, Notre Dame most likely experiences even higher attendance figures
in more competitive seasons, which supports the above proposition. Professional teams
such as the Browns, with a large fan base even in losing seasons, also experienced a rise
in attendance that generally correlated to their rise in record. See Rushin, supra note 3, at
62 (showing that the Browns' attendance was generally reflective of that season's perfor-
mance).
19. Fans' interest in competitive contests is shown by higher attendance at playoff
games, which normally feature two quality teams. See supra note 12 (comparing regular
season and playoff attendance).
20. The success of the NFL is apparent because it has outlasted all of its rivals and
has always posted higher average game attendance than any of its rivals, even the rela-
tively successful AFL. NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 350.
21. The NFL cooperates in the form of television revenue sharing and joint agreements
for player allocation.
22. See infra part ll.D.1.
23. See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1342-43 (2d Cir. 1988); AFL v. NFL,
205 F. Supp. 60, 66 (D. Md. 1962), affid, 323 F.2d 124 (4th Cir. 1963).
24. The NFL has come under antitrust attack from its players several times, most
recently in Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041 (D.C. Cir.), cert. granted, 116 S.
Ct. 593 (1995). These decisions have revolved around labor disputes and in general have
not presented problems unique to the NFL. Any new regulation of the NFL could address
the labor issues presented in these cases, but existing labor law and labor-related antitrust
law have not had the application problems that other areas of antitrust law have had with
respect to the NFL. See, e.g., Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 623 (8th Cir. 1976) (hold-
ing that the NFL's rule requiring a team that acquires a free agent to compensate the free
agent's former club is an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act),
cert. dismissed, 434 U.S. 801 (1977).
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II. APPLICATION OF ANTITRUST LAW TO THE NFL
A. General Antitrust Law
An understanding of why antitrust law is difficult to apply to
the NFL, and thus why such application should not be attempted,
requires consideration of the purpose and operation of antitrust law
in the United States. Congress passed The Sherman Antitrust Act"
in 1890 in response to public outrage toward the excesses of big
business.'
1. Sherman Antitrust Act Section 1
Section 1 of the Act deals with conspiracies on the part of
multiple firms to restrain trade.' It prohibits concerted action by
multiple firms for the purpose of controlling prices and supply in a
market." In applying the Act, courts have developed two tests to
determine whether a Section 1 violation exists, the per se test and
the rule of reason test.' The per se test recognizes violations
whenever a certain type of activity is present, whether or not the
intent of the activity is to restrain trade and regardless of its actual
empirical effects on restraining trade." The Supreme Court created
25. Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides the following:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by
fine not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person,
$350,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said pun-
ishments in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994). Section 2 states the following:
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in
the discretion of the court.
Id. § 2.
26. ARTHUR D. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLICY § 3.1, at 3-1 to 3-2
(1976).
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
28. JOSEPH W. BURNS, A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST LAWS 37 (1958).
29. Id. at 39.
30. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 342-57 (1982) (dis-
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the per se test by noting that certain types of agreements may have
the "necessary effect" of interfering with competition.3' Some ac-
tivities that the Supreme Court found to be per se violations in-
clude price-fixing, territorial market division, and collective refusals
to deal.32
The rule of reason test allows the court to consider whether
the activity under scrutiny is really a restraint of trade by looking
beyond the activity itself. 33 The activity may be necessary for the
efficient operation of the firms involved, despite the fact that its
form is one that usually causes a restraint of trade. The Supreme
Court created the rule early in the development of antitrust law by
holding that the interpretation of the Sherman Act required applica-
tion of the common law rule of reason.34
2. Sherman Antitrust Act Section 2
Section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act addresses the existence
of monopoly power in the hands of a single firm as a restraint of
trade.35 Section 2 endeavors to prevent firms from acquiring the
monopolistic power to raise prices and restrict output. A monopoly
exists when a firm controls enough of an output market to enable
it "to control prices or exclude competition."36 The output market
includes all of one type of product, or all products that compete
against each other.37 For example, different brands of television
sets compete in the same output market because a consumer must
choose between brands when deciding to buy a television. A vacu-
cussing the cost benefits of using a per se test in finding that a per se violation of price
fixing existed).
31. For a brief summary of the development of the Section 1 tests, see BURNS, supra
note 28, at 39. The origin of the per se test can be traced to Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). That case established the rule of reason doctrine, thus begin-
ning a differentiation between acts that would be found violations on their face and those
that would not.
32. See BURNS, supra note 28, at 39, for a list of cases outlining each of these as a
per se violation.
33. National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)
(stating that the rule of reason requires "analyzing the facts peculiar to the business, the
history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was imposed").
34. See BURNS, supra note 28, at 39.
35. See United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 339 U.S. 960, 960 (1950) (hold-
ing that defendants violated Section 2 by acting in restraint of trade and commerce among
the states).
36. United States v. du Pont & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).
37. See AUSTIN, supra note 26, § 5.8, at 5-16 ("Delineation of a product market typi-
cally focuses on the 'demand' function by evaluating for possible inclusion all substitute
products that have a significant effect on sales of the defendant.").
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urn cleaner is not in the same output market as a television, be-
cause if a consumer wants a television, that consumer will not
consider buying a vacuum cleaner. Section 2 tries to keep a single
firm from controlling a large percentage of the output market since
that firm could theoretically charge unfair prices due to the lack of
a large number of suppliers." The percentage of market share re-
quired by courts to find a Section 2 violation has varied.39
Section 2 does not prohibit the legal acquisition and existence
of monopolies; it merely prohibits use of monopoly power to main-
tain a monopoly position.' A monopoly may legally attain its
position in a number of ways. A monopoly may be legally ac-
quired as a result of a superior product or service." A monopoly
may also be legally acquired through ability or intelligence.4"
B. The Purpose of Antitrust Law
The purpose behind the Sherman Antitrust Act and antitrust
law in general is to protect consumer interests through maintaining
competition and preventing trade restraints.43 This purpose is
based on the theory that competition in a free market will produce
the best results for consumers because restraint of competition will
allow firms to take unfair advantage of consumers by raising prices
and reducing output.' Antitrust law does not compel competi-
tion.45 It does seek to prevent firms from harming consumers by
38. Creation of a monopoly could begin with a firm charging very low prices. A firm
with high but not complete control of an output market may lower prices below cost.
This could occur if the firm is able to sell at losses for a longer period than its competi-
tors. The firm's low prices will eventually drive competitors out of business. The firm
then has complete control of the output market, enabling it to charge higher prices than if
competition existed because consumers' only options are to buy from the firm or not buy
the product at all.
39. United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 528 (1948) ("The relative
effect of percentage command of a market varies with the setting in which that factor is
placed.").
40. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 432 (2d Cir. 1945)
(stating that a monopolist must have intent as well as power to monopolize to fall within
Section 2 of the Sherman Act).
41. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp. 244, 248 (D.R.I. 1964), affd, 384
U.S. 563 (1966); Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 938 (10th Cir. 1954).
42. Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 658 (8th Cir. 1957).
43. United States v. Von's Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 274 (1966); see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 51 (1978) ("The only legitimate goal of American antitrust law
is the maximization of consumer welfare.").
44. "Monopoly profits typically are founded upon output restriction, above-competitive
prices, and a contrived misallocation of resources." CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STAN-
LEY L. BRUE, MICROECONOMIcs 322 (1990).
45. See United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417, 444 (1920) (stating
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restricting competition.' Whether injury to the public results from
an activity is usually an important factor in the determination of
whether the activity is an antitrust violation.47
C. Example of Conventional Application of Antitrust Law
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America' provides an il-
lustration of conventional application of the Sherman Act. The
Aluminum Company of America (ALCOA) was charged with vio-
lating the Sherman Act by monopolizing the manufacture of virgin
aluminum ingots.49 The court's first step in analyzing whether a
violation existed was to consider ALCOA's output market share by
determining the appropriate market and ALCOA's share of that
market." It found that ALCOA's output market consisted of vir-
gin ingots only because the supply of secondary, or recycled, in-
gots was in effect controlled by the supply of virgin ingots, from
which the secondary ingots originally came." The court compared
ALCOA's production of ingots with the total production of all
virgin ingot manufacturers and found that ALCOA's control over
the ingot market was over ninety percent.5 2 The court held as a
matter of law that such high market share constituted a viola-
tion,53 though it said that a sixty percent share may not be a vio-
lation and a thirty percent share would not be. 4 The court reject-
ed ALCOA's contention that because the company did not use the
monopoly to charge unfair prices, no violation existed.' Proving a
that the goal is to fight the realization of monopoly, not the expectation of it).
46. United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 388 (1923) (stating that
the goal of the Sherman Act is to secure equality of opportunity by fighting the forces
that destroy real competition).
47. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605 (1985). But
see Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d 520, 536-37 (7th Cir. 1986) (resting the deci-
sion upon whether post hoc analysis could clearly identify whether adverse impacts on
ultimate consumers would be unjust). Fishman does not directly contradict Aspen Skiing.
Fishman concedes that identifying consumer effects may be relevant to the extent that it
is feasible and sheds light on the impact of an alleged violation on the competitive pro-
cess. Id. at 537.
48. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
49. ld. at 421.
50. Il at 422-25.
51. Id. at 425.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 425.
54. Id. at 424.
55. Id. at 427 ("[I]t is no excuse for 'monopolizing' a market that the monopoly has
not been used to extract from the consumer more than a 'fair' profit.").
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monopoly existed (from which monopolistic intent could be in-
ferred) was enough to establish a violation.56
D. The Application of Antitrust Law to the NFL
Despite the unique qualities of the NFL that make defining its
economic characteristics very difficult, legal opponents of the
league have made economic-based attacks in the form of antitrust
lawsuits. Courts have been forced to try to apply antitrust law to
the NFL. The results have been inconsistent and have not always
served the purpose for which antitrust law was created: protection
of consumer interests."
1. The League as a Single Entity
The NFL has argued that it should be considered a single
entity for purposes of application of Section 1 of the Sherman Act
so that concerted action by teams is not collusion between indepen-
dent firms.58 The NFL has a number of qualities that make it ap-
pear to be a single entity. The single entity debate has been thor-
oughly discussed by courts and commentators.59 The fact that the
league as a whole produces a product and the impossibility of
individual teams to produce apart from the league are among the
factors supporting a single entity view of the NFL.'
The independent operation of the teams and the lack of any
financial support obligation between teams support the view that
56. Id.; see also infra note 153 (discussing latent monopoly power).
57. See supra part II.B (discussing the purpose of antitrust law).
58. Michael S. Jacobs, Professional Sports Leagues, Antitrust, and the Single-Entity
Theory: A Defense of the Status Quo, 67 IND. LJ. 25, 27-28 n.11 (1991) (explaining the
NFL's interest in being treated as a single entity).
59. Many sources discuss the single entity argument. See generally Los Angeles Me-
morial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990
(1984); North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1074 (1982); Lee Goldman, Sports, Antitrust, and the Single Entity Theory, 63 TUL.
L. REv. 751 (1989); Myron C. Grauer, Recognition of the National Football League as a
Single Entity Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: Implications of the Consumer Welfare
Model, 82 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1983); Jacobs, supra note 58; Gary R. Roberts, The Single
Entity Status of Sports Leagues Under Section 1 of the Sherman Act: An Alternative
View, 60 TuL. L. REv. 562 (1987); Gary R. Roberts, Sports Leagues and the Sherman
Act: The Use and Abuse of Section 1 to Regulate Restraints on Intraleague Rivalry, 32
UCLA L. REv. 219 (1984) [hereinafter Roberts, Sports Leagues]; Thane N. Rosenbaum,
The Antitrust Implications of Professional Sports Leagues Revisited: Emerging Trends in
the Modern Era, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 729 (1987).
60. Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 59, at 227-31.
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the NFL is merely a joint venture made up of distinct entities.6'
Opponents of the single entity view maintain that the interdepen-
dence between teams is merely a result of the business form cho-
sen and is not required for the league to function.62 The teams
could have incorporated as a single entity but chose not to.63 Al-
though television revenue is shared, teams do not share profits or
losses.' This financial independence of individual teams supports
the position that the NFL should not be treated as a single entity.
This Note assumes that the single entity view of the NFL is
correct because of the high level of team interdependence. 65  A
team apart from the league would generate little fan interest be-
cause it would have no one to play, so it could not survive.'
Since the teams cannot survive apart from the league, they cannot
be considered distinct entities capable of determining their own
course in the market, and therefore the league must be treated as a
single entity. The notion that the NFL's teams could have joined
together as a single corporation ignores the fact that they instead
chose to take on a different single entity form, namely a partner-
ship.6' As a partnership with the member teams as partners, the
NFL should be "an entity distinct from its partners. 68
The courts have responded inconsistently to the NFL's and
61. Jacobs, supra note 58, at 30; Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 749 n.82.
62. Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 782.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. This Note does not focus on the single entity debate, which is applicable to con-
sideration of Section 1 violations of the Sherman Act. Arguments supporting recognition
of the NFL as a single entity are discussed in greater depth in Roberts, Sports Leagues,
supra note 59. Recognizing the NFL as a single entity is important because this Note
maintains that the NFL should be treated as a single natural monopoly for purposes of
Section 2 of the Sherman Act. However, such recognition is not vital to this Note's anal-
ysis, because the same conclusions would apply if the NFL were an oligopoly. The Su-
preme Court extended Section 2 to cover oligopolistic situations in American Tobacco Co.
v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809-10 (1946) (finding that the large market share held
by three producers combined was sufficient to find violations of Section 2).
66. The idea that a single team cannot survive has been attacked by pointing to the
Harlem Globetrotters, who play exhibition games to large audiences, always beating the
hapless Washington Generals. Jacobs, supra note 58, at 42 n.70. This is a poor analogy
because the Globetrotters do not survive as a sports team, but instead as a group of
entertainers. Their appeal is purely in their comic antics and amazing tricks of coordina-
tion with a basketball and has little or nothing to do with the "game" that is going on.
67. See Grauer, supra note 59, at 23-35 (comparing the NFL's structure and that of a
law partnership).
68. UNIF. PARTNmHiP Acr § 201 (1994). Although the Revised UPA is not accepted
in most states yet, it represents the latest trend in legal scholarship.
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other sports leagues' argument that they are single entities. In Mid-
South Grizzlies v. NFL,69 the court allowed joint action by the
NFL's teams to pass an antitrust attack.7" The National Basketball
Association (NBA) and the National Hockey League (NHL) have
been recognized as single entities by courts.71 Congress, while not
explicitly recognizing the NFL as a single entity, did allow it to
sign television deals and share revenue from those deals among its
teams as if it were a single entity. However, a majority of
courts reject the NFL's claim that it is a single entity, though the
reasons for doing so have not been clearly articulated.73 In at least
69. 550 F. Supp. 558 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 720 F.2d 772 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. de-
nied, 467 U.S. 1215 (1984).
70. In deciding to apply a rule of reason test to the alleged violations in this case, the
court stressed the practical need for the league to engage in joint activity. It chose not to
address the single entity defense because the NFL's conduct was found not to be in vio-
lation of antitrust laws regardless of whether the league was a single entity. Id. at 562.
The court did note that the Second Circuit had rejected the single entity defense based on
different facts, citing North American Soccer League v. NFL. Id. at 562 n.11. However,
that case merely cited precedent without providing reasoning for rejecting the NFL's sin-
gle entity contention. See North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249, 1256-57 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1074 (1982).
71. Levin v. NBA, 385 F. Supp. 149, 152-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (granting summary
judgment motion of defendant because prospective buyers of NBA team who were reject-
ed by the league were not prevented from competing but merely from joining the compe-
tition); San Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974) (find-
ing that NHL teams are "members of a single unit" in holding that no Sherman Act
Section I violation existed).
72. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
73. See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1256-57 (citing laundry list of
precedents); Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180-81 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (calling
the league a "joint venture" and applying Section 1 to it but not specifically addressing
the single entity issue); Mackey v. NFL, 543 F.2d 606, 620-22 (8th Cir. 1976) (holding
the NFL liable for Section 1 violations after applying the rule of reason test to restric-
tions on free agent signing); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 468 F.
Supp. 154, 164 (C.D. Cal. 1979), affd, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
990 (1984) (concluding that the competition between teams for players, and in some loca-
tions for fans, indicates that NFL teams are economic competitors).
With the exception of the court in Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission,
none of the courts provided reasoning for their conclusion. They merely referred to earlier
cases, based ultimately on Radovich v. NFL, 352 U.S. 445 (1957). That case specifically
denied the NFL an antitrust exemption like that possessed by major league baseball but
did not mention the single entity debate or provide reasoning for its denial of an exemp-
tion other than saying that the reasons why baseball had an exemption did not apply to
the NFL. See id. at 449-52. The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission conclusion
was based in part on reasoning regarding competition for fans that is no longer valid
because teams in two of the three locations it mentioned have moved (Los Angeles and
Baltimore); moreover, it ignored fan loyalty and revenue other than ticket receipts. See
Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum, 468 F. Supp. at 164.
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one case, Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL,74
the court decided that NFL restrictions on team movement violated
Section 1 of the Sherman Act;75 this resulted in action that was
arguably against consumer interest. Due to that decision, the people
of Oakland lost the Oakland Raiders.76 Courts have not established
a definite rule nor have they always shown deference to consumer
interests in cases involving the single entity status of the NFL and
other sports leagues.
2. Defining the Product of the NFL
Analysis of a business organization for application of Section
2 of the Sherman Act must consider what the organization produc-
es. A firm can only have monopoly power if its product makes up
a large enough segment of the market.' Determining whether a
product makes up a large segment of a market first requires know-
ing what that product is. In normal application of Section 2, prod-
uct identification is not a problem. Companies produce tangible
output that can be easily quantified, such as so many tons of steel.
This output can be compared to the overall amount of steel pro-
duced to indicate how much power a company has in a market.
There has been considerable debate surrounding the nature of
the NFL's output.' The league's base for producing its product is
the professional football game. But the value of any single game is
enhanced by and depends upon its place within a season and a
series of seasons, such that individual games cannot be considered
the league's product.79 Counting the amount of games played over
74. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
75. Id. at 1398.
76. The court found that an NFL rule requiring approval of three-fourths of the mem-
ber teams for one team to move into another's territory to be a violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act. The court affirmed an injunction preventing the NFL from interfering
with the move of the Oakland Raiders to Los Angeles. Id. at 1398, 1401. See infra part
IV.D.2 (discussing Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission).
77. AUSTIN, supra note 26, § 5.8, at 5-16.
78. See Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1393 (calling the Super
Bowl "the ultimate NFL product"); North Am. Soccer League v. NFL, 670 F.2d 1249,
1251 (1982) (identifying the NFL's business as "providing public entertainment in the
form of competitive football games"); Roberts, Sports Leagues, supra note 59, at 229 (de-
fining the NFL's product as the "interrelationship among the 224 regular season and nine
playoff games, culminating in the Super Bowl"). But see Jacobs, supra note 58, at 54
n.126 (defining the NFL's product as individual games and not the season to which these
games belong).
79. Professor Jacobs claims that individual games are the league's true product and that
games do have significant value apart from the season. He points to the existence of
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a period of time is not analogous to counting tons of steel pro-
duced because the games cannot stand alone. A ton of steel is the
same whether or not it is the only ton of steel produced by a
company. A single NFL game's value depends upon things such as
the popularity of players involved in the game, the intensity of the
rivalry between the teams, and the importance of the game in the
playoff hunt. None of these factors can exist without considering
other games, often from other seasons. Simply counting games
ignores these factors. Perhaps counting games would be appropriate
if any combination of factors could be differentiated in the compu-
tation to account for the fact that each game has a different value.
Such a computation would be difficult and highly subjective. The
problem in defining something as basic as the league's product
increases the difficulty in applying Section 2, which requires a
quantifiable product as a basis for market share.
This difficulty is reflected by the fact that courts have given
little consideration to exactly what product the NFL, or any sports
league, produces. Although they have dealt extensively with the
question of what output market for the product is appropriate,"
they have not defined exactly what the product is. The cases that
attempt to define the product of leagues do so through generaliza-
tions that are useless in formulating the type of specific analysis
required for application of antitrust law.' This failure on the part
college football to prove this. Jacobs, supra note 58, at 54 n.126. Pointing to college
football, however, does not show the viability of a single game apart from a season.
College teams play seasons in pursuit of a goal. Depending on the team, that goal may
be a conference championship or national playoff birth and shot at the national champion-
ship in NCAA I-AA to NCAA III or NAIA. Even independent Division I teams play a
season with the goal (whether or not realistic) of being voted national champions in one
of the several polls or at least making a bowl appearance. The bowl games are no more
divorced from the season than are late season NFL games between teams that can have
no effect on the playoff picture.
The NFL's product goes beyond even seasons, however. For example, a recent Mon-
day Night Football game between the San Francisco Forty-Niners and the Los Angeles
Raiders drew interest beyond that which would normally be attracted by the teams be-
cause Jerry Rice was approaching and in fact passed Jim Brown's record for career
touchdowns. See Jim Trotter, Rice's TD Binge Lifts Him to Top of Charts, SAN DIEGO
UNION TRIB., Sept. 6, 1994, at Dl (detailing Rice's performance in front of a record
Candlestick Park crowd). The product the NFL offered that night depended not only upon
all the games and seasons Jerry Rice had played in his career, but also upon all the
games and seasons Jim Brown had played, as well as the games and seasons played by
all the players who could not match the accomplishments of Brown and Rice.
80. See infra notes 86-88 (discussing possible output markets).
81. See North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1251 (defining the NFL's product only
as "public entertainment in the form of competitive football games between its member
1046 [Vol. 46:1033
THE NEED FOR AN ALTERNATIVE
of courts to define the product of sports leagues in quantifiable
terms that would allow an analysis of market share for Section 2
purposes is not a result of the courts' inadequacy, but of the prob-
lems involved in developing a quantifiable definition because of the
unique nature of the leagues' products. 2
3. Defining the Output Market
Once an organization's product is identified, the amount of
product that it produces must be compared to the aggregate output
of all organizations producing that product, or the output market, to
determine market share. Large market share is the most common
indication of a Section 2 violation."
Assuming the product of the NFL could be simply defined,
for example as single football games, the output market in which
the NFL competes is very difficult to determine. The possible
output market range extends from the unique brand of professional
football offered by the NFL to professional sports in general to all
forms of leisure activity. The purpose of defining an output market
is to analyze whether a firm produces a disproportionately large
share of the product, giving it an unfair advantage.84 Defining
exactly where the NFL fits in this market would require analysis of
the preferences of anyone who watches or attends NFL games,
buys NFL merchandise, or visits the Pro Football Hall of Fame. If
a fan is willing to watch a professional football game on television
but would take a nap if no game were on, to that fan the NFL has
no competition in the output market. If a fan decides between
watching a NBA game or an NFL game, that fan places the NFL's
output in a market which includes other professional sports. If a
fan is torn between attending an NFL game or an opera, the appro-
priate output market for that person would be leisure activity in
general.
To determine which market is appropriate for the NFL, an
teams" without giving any definition that could be used in any quantitative analysis, mak-
ing no mention of seasons, past season, or peripherals); Fishman v. Wirtz, 1981-2 Trade
Cas. (CCH) T 64,378, at 74,756 (N.D. I11. 1981) (characterizing professional basketball as
a "form of entertainment which is unique in the eyes of the consumer" but also failing to
offer a quantifiable definition).
82. This Note does note seek to define the NFL's product. It merely notes the great
difficulty in determining such a definition and that this difficulty makes application of
conventional antitrust law problematic.
83. See generally supra notes 36-39 (discussing violations of Section 2).
84. Id.
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analysis must consider the individual preferences of all consumers
of the NFL's product, possibly including a weighted average based
on a survey of consumers' willingness to spend money on certain
items. Such an analysis must include differentiation based on fac-
tors that make games distinct from one another, such as playoff
games, rivalries, and popular players. This is much more difficult
to evaluate than objective figures such as sales volume. Since
consumer preferences vary over time, the results of such an analy-
sis will also vary, so the analysis would have to be repeated every
time an antitrust challenge is brought up. Because the results would
change over time, however, no consistent answer to the antitrust
question of appropriate output market would be produced."
Inability to define the product of sports leagues such as the
NFL has prevented courts from reaching a consensus in defining
the appropriate output market of the NFL. Courts have used many
different points along the possible output market spectrum. Some
have found a broad entertainment market to be appropriate. 6 Oth-
ers have used a narrower entertainment market, but one that still
extends beyond the sport in question." Many courts have found
that sports leagues compete in an output market made up only of
the particular sport and competition level." None of the market
definitions were based on any study of the league's competition in
the eyes of consumers. In no case has a court defined a product
market and then stated that a sports league makes up a specific
percentage of that market."
85. "Once the statistics on market share are fixed, the judgment on monopoly in fact
is made." AUSTIN, supra note 26, § 5.8, at 5-17. If market share statistics cannot be
fixed, no "judgment on monopoly in fact" can be made. Cf id.
86. See, e.g., Theatre Party Assocs. v. Shubert Org., 1988-2 Trade Cas. (CCH)
68,251, at 59,558 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (noting that a theatre production's output market may
include sporting exhibitions).
87. See, e.g., North Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d at 1258 (finding that the NFL com-
petes with other sports leagues).
88. See, e.g., Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 570 F.2d 982, 988 (D.C. Cir. 1977); San
Francisco Seals, Ltd. v. NHL, 379 F. Supp. 966, 970 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Fishman v. Wirtz,
1981-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 91 64,378, at 74,763. The courts in each of these cases found
that the sports leagues competed against other professional leagues of the same sport.
89. The exception, of course, is when courts found the league to be its own output
market, in which case it necessarily makes up 100% of the market.
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E. Why Antitrust Law Should Not Be Applied to the NFL
Antitrust law is not applicable to the unique circumstances of
the NFL. The need to consider a firm's product and output market
to determine if a violation exists precludes antitrust law from being
useful when applied to the NFL. Since courts cannot determine the
product and output market of the NFL, they cannot find violations
that are based on findings about product and output market. Courts
have invented many different definitions of the NFL's product and
output market to try to warp the NFL into a structure with which
antitrust law can deal." However, the realities of the league's
characteristics simply do not allow them to be considered in eco-
nomic-based antitrust terms.
In addition to the fact that the NFL's characteristics do not
allow meaningful application of antitrust law, the purpose of anti-
trust law is not served when it is applied to the league." The in-
terests of the consumers, or fans, of the NFL must be considered
by antitrust law for it to be properly applied. Fans have indicated
that one of their important interests is in seeing the best football
players compete against each other.' A reasonable assumption is
that fans are also interested in seeing these contests, whether on
television or in person, at the lowest possible cost. Antitrust law
rests on the assumption that consumer interests are best served
through competition in the market. Such an assumption may not be
valid in the case of the NFL; a fan's interests may not be served
by competition between leagues in a market. Competition between
leagues will divide the best players between leagues, preventing
fans from seeing all the best players compete against each other.
Competition between leagues has resulted in player bidding
wars.93 Increasing player salaries would probably lead to the need
for leagues to charge higher prices, either in the form of higher
ticket and peripheral prices or perhaps in shifting games from free
to pay television.94 Antitrust laws designed to promote competition
90. See supra part II.D.3 (demonstrating how the antitrust concept of output market has
been applied to the NFL).
91. See supra part II.B (discussing the purpose of antitrust law).
92. See supra note 18 (discussing fans' interest in seeing competitive matches).
93. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REV. 643, 731 n.397
(1989) (citing the example of the rise in NFL salaries after the commencement of the
USFL).
94. One could argue that interleague competition would lead to lower prices in order
to attract more fans to games. However, since most of each team's revenue comes from
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could produce results diametrically opposed to results that would
be in the interests of fans. Since the NFL's product and output
market are not definable to the extent necessary for an antitrust
analysis and since application of antitrust law to the NFL does not
serve the purpose for which it was created, courts cannot properly
apply antitrust law to the NFL.
III. ANALYSIS: THE NFL SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A NATURAL
MONOPOLY
Whether or not courts can properly apply antitrust law to the
NFL, they must consider how the NFL fits into the law when the
league is attacked on antitrust grounds. The league is a natural
monopoly under existing legal and economic principles. Treatment
as a natural monopoly will limit the circumstances under which
legal challengers can make antitrust attacks. It will also necessitate
an alternate mechanism of regulation similar to those that exist for
other natural monopolies.
A. Characteristics of a Natural Monopoly
The NFL possesses the characteristics that identify a firm as a
natural monopoly. The economic characteristics are not always the
same characteristics as those which courts have used to find natural
monopolies. However, the NFL possesses both legal and economic
features indicating that it is a natural monopoly.
1. Economic Definition and Characteristics
Natural monopolies exist in industries in which the disciplin-
ary pressures of a competitive system are inoperative.95 This oc-
curs in cases in which one firm can meet demand at lower costs
than multiple firms.96 If one firm can meet demand at the lowest
television, see supra note 17, leagues must first serve the needs of the television market,
which would require generating revenue by any means to get the better players for the
television audience. Also, the size of the television audience and the difficulty involved in
attending NFL games support an assumption that a league would act to expand its televi-
sion audience at the expense of in-person fans for two reasons. First, the difficulties in-
volved with in-person attendance (purchasing tickets, driving to the game, parking, etc.)
indicate that in-person fans probably have a more inelastic demand curve because they are
willing to endure more to see a game, so leagues face less risk of losing those fans than
television fans. Additionally, the sheer number superiority of television fans would proba-
bly induce a league to keep that audience at the expense of losing in-person fans due to
increased ticket prices.
95. AuSTIN, supra note 26, § 4.9, at 4-10.
96. Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548,
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cost, competition reduces efficiency by increasing overall costs
instead of promoting efficiencyY Firms that compete in an indus-
try that is subject to a natural monopoly tend to merge or engage
in competition that will destroy one of the two firms.98
When products of monopolies have no close substitutes, a
natural monopoly may exist.9 Consumers either purchase from the
monopoly supplier or go without the product. No substitutes exist
because one or more barriers prevent competition."°° Natural mo-
nopolies are created by barriers that are inherent to the industry:
low marginal costs, which means that average costs decline as
output is expanded, and impracticality or unworkability of competi-
tion.'0 ' The typical example of a natural monopoly is a public
utility such as a firm supplying electricity."°e Once electricity is
being generated, increasing the number of houses that receive the
electricity can be done at low cost. Thus, total average costs de-
cline as output is increased. Competing electric companies would
each have reduced output due to the competition and thus higher
average costs, meaning that competition would actually increase
costs to consumers.
0 3
2. Legal Definition and Characteristics
Legal acquisition of a monopoly is possible through several
means. A monopolist may legally achieve its position through
ability or intelligence."' It could acquire its monopoly by offering
a superior product or service.'
548 (1969) (discussing justifications for regulation of natural monopolies).
97. McCoNNELL & BRUE, supra note 44, at 220.
98. AUSTIN, supra note 26, § 4.9, at 4-11.
99. McCoNNELL & BRUE, supra note 44, at 217.
100. Id. at 218.
101. Id. at 219-20. For background reading on the economic terminology for costs, see
id. at 174-76. Marginal cost is a firm's cost of producing one additional unit of output.
Per unit production costs can vary as the number of units produced changes. Production
requires both fixed costs, such as the cost of heating a factory, which are the same re-
gardless of the number of units produced, and variable costs, such as the cost of materi-
als used in a product, which vary directly based on how many units are produced. Low
marginal costs exist when fixed costs are the major portion of a firm's costs. This means
that additional output requires only a small increase in variable costs on the part of the
firm. Fixed costs do not increase as output increases. The result is that as output increas-
es, the average cost of each unit of output drops.
102. Id. at 220.
103. Id.
104. Kansas City Star Co. v. United States, 240 F.2d 643, 660 (8th Cir. 1957).
105. Cole v. Hughes Tool Co., 215 F.2d 924, 938 (10th Cir. 1954).
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Special characteristics and needs of an industry can bring
about special regulation." While not applicable solely to natural
monopolies, lawmakers have used this idea as the basis for ex-
empting some industries from antitrust law and instead using alter-
nate regulation mechanisms." 7
A monopoly may legally exist because the benefits of compe-
tition are limited."8 This is essentially the same as the basic eco-
nomic definition that a natural monopoly exists when the disciplin-
ary pressures of competition fail to operate. Legal definitions of
natural monopoly seem to incorporate the features of economic
definitions but are broader in that they consider more situations to
be natural monopolies than economic definitions.
Courts have found legal natural monopolies in a variety of
situations. A firm that won an exclusive contract to manufacture
two-way radios may have acquired a natural monopoly." A
newspaper operating in a city capable of supporting only one
newspaper had a natural monopoly,"0 while the cable television
industry within a city was also found to be a natural monopo-
ly.1"
B. The National Football League's Natural Monopoly
Characteristics
The National Football League possesses characteristics that
make it a natural monopoly according to both economic and legal
definitions.
1. Economic Natural Monopoly Characteristics
Disciplinary pressures of competition force a firm to reduce
prices and raise quality so that at least some consumers will
choose that firm's products over a competitor's. Firms that cannot
attract consumers and still compete on a cost basis are driven out
106. AUSTIN, supra note 26, § 4.9, at 4-11.
107. See id. (arguing that the need to protect the public from bank failure is a justifica-
tion for bank regulation, national defense is a special need used to explain international
shipping regulation, and the need for integrity in stock transactions necessitates regulation
of the New York Stock Exchange).
108. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 126 (7th
Cir. 1982) (finding that cable television in Indianapolis was a natural monopoly).
109. Ovitron Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 295 F. Supp. 373, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
110. Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc., 284 F.2d 582, 584 (lst
Cir. 1960).
111. Omega Satellite Prods. Co., 694 F.2d at 126.
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of the market. These pressures are inoperative on the NFL. Since
one of consumers' demands is a league made up of the best play-
ers," 2 competition between multiple leagues would not meet de-
mand because the best players would not always play each oth-
er."' Even if division of best players were not a problem, multi-
ple leagues would not meet demand at lowest costs. The brief
periods in which multiple leagues existed were marked by player
bidding wars, which increased the primary cost of the leagues." 4
The impossibility of meeting demand with multiple leagues and the
cost increase that would occur if multiple leagues competed for
players render the disciplinary pressures of competition inoperative.
The characteristics of the NFL thus match the economic definition
of natural monopoly situation." '
Illustrating the inability of competitive forces to operate in a
market with the NFL is the merger and failure of all would-be
competitor leagues. Firms that try to compete with a natural mo-
nopoly tend to merge or engage in competition that will destroy
one of the two firms." 6 This is exactly what has happened to the
leagues that have tried to compete with the NFL."' Without even
considering the economic traits of the NFL, repeated failure of
rival leagues suggests that the league is a natural monopoly.
112. See supra note 18 (discussing fans' interest in seeing competitive matches).
113. But see Ross, supra note 93, at 724-25 (arguing that fan demand for a single
championship and interleague competition could be met by agreements between multiple
leagues to compete in a championship game, have interleague scheduling, and allocate
players).
114. See id. at 730-33 (discussing the predatory pricing, including bidding wars, that
new leagues engage in to compete with established leagues).
115. See supra part III.A.1.
116. See supra part lI.A.1.
117. Since the inception of the NFL, several rival leagues have attempted to compete
with it. The more noteworthy ones are the All-American Football Conference (AAFC), the
1960's American Football League (AFL) (as opposed to less successful earlier AFLs), the
World Football League (WFL), and the United States Football League (USFL). The AAFC
began operation in 1946. By 1949, financial difficulties forced the league to fold but not
before the NFL agreed to accept three of its teams, the Cleveland Browns, the San Fran-
cisco Forty-Niners, and the Baltimore Colts (not the direct predecessor of the current
Indianapolis Colts). JACK CLARY, GREAT TEAMS' GREAT YEARs: CLEVELAND BRowNs 28-
30 (1973). The AFL, which took the field for the first time in 1960, was the NFL's most
successful competitor but this competition lasted only until 1967, at which time the
leagues agreed to merge. DAVID HARRIS, THE LEAGUE: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE
NFL 62-63, 65-66 (1986). The more recent challenger leagues have had no success. The
WFL ceased operation after two forgetful seasons from 1975-1977. Id. at 168-70, 215-16.
The USFL fared little better, playing only 1983-85 and making its biggest splash not on
the football field but in the courtroom through its antitrust attack on the NFL. See gener-
ally USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988).
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The economic barriers of low marginal costs and impracticali-
ty of multiple firms that prevent other firms from entering and
competing with a natural monopoly.. s exist in the NFL. The
NFL's low marginal costs are a result of its high percentage of
fixed costs. The major cost item of the NFL is player salaries. "9
As of the 1994 season, these costs are fixed by a salary cap. 2
Even before the NFL's imposition of a salary cap, these costs were
fixed costs. A fixed cost is one that does not vary with changes in
output.12' An increase in number of games clearly represents an
increase in the NFL's output, however that may be defined. On an
individual team level, the fixed cost nature of player salaries is
illustrated by the fact that teams that make the playoffs play more
games thus have more output but do not have increased salary
costs because they played more games than other teams.'22 On a
league level, which is more applicable to this discussion, the fixed
cost nature of salaries can be shown by comparing average salary
changes in years in which the total number of league games
changed.'23 Low marginal costs and impracticality of multiple
118. MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 44, at 220.
119. The following is NFL league averages (1993):
Player Compensation $31.9 million
Total Expenses $49.3 million
Compensation as Percent of Expenses 64.7%
Ozanian, supra note 17, at 18 n.4.
120. Jeff Babineau, NFL Seeks to Level the Playing Field with Team Salary Caps,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Nov. 21, 1993, at C13.
121. MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note 44, at 172.
122. Because the shares paid to participants of playoff games are paid by the league,
see NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 316, 323-25 (listing the share paid to each player
on each team playing in their respective championship games and the Super Bowl), indi-
vidual teams do not incur greater salary costs by participating in playoff games, unless
their players' contracts have incentive clauses based on postseason participation.
123. Following the 1977 season, the NFL increased the number of regular season games
played by each team from 14 to 16 and added two wildcard playoff games (one in each
conference). NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 264. Average player salaries and percent-
age increases from 1974 to 1981 were as follows:
Year Average Salary Percent Increase
1974 $33,000 20.0%
1975 $39,600 20.0%
1976 $47,500 19.9%
1977 $55,300 16.4%
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league competition, which as discussed above results from fans'
interest in seeing the best players concentrated in one league, are
natural monopoly barriers that prevent competitors from being able
to challenge the NFL.
2. Legal Natural Monopoly Characteristics
The NFL achieved its position for several reasons, each of
which involves a means that courts have recognized as a legal way
of attaining a monopoly.'24 It achieved its position through the
ability and intelligence of its management. Whether the NFL has
always been managed with great intelligence is both subjective and
not important. What is important is that the NFL has been man-
aged with more intelligence than its rivals, in particular the USFL
and WFL. Poor management of these leagues hastened their deaths
and allowed the NFL to maintain its position through the perfectly
legal means of exercising its relatively greater ability and manage-
rial skill."2 The quality of the NFL's product can only be objec-
tively evaluated by looking at attendance and television ratings,
from which a relative level of product quality can be inferred. The
NFL's attendance and television ratings have been better than those
of any rival league, indicating that the NFL achieved and main-
tained its monopoly because of its superior product. 6
1978 $62,600 13.2%
1979 $68,900 10.1%
1980 $78,700 14.2%
1981 $90,000 14.4%
Don Pierson, Players Sure to Want a Slice of NFL's Rich New TV Pie, Ci. TRIB., Mar.
11, 1990, Sports, at 11.
Average salaries in 1978 increased by the second lowest percentage for any year
between 1974 and 1981. This indicates that the increase in number of games, which is a
quantifiable measure of output, was not matched by an increase in salary costs beyond
normal yearly increases. Salary costs must therefore be considered fixed in relation to
output.
124. See supra part III.A.2.
125. See USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1344 (2d Cir. 1988) (noting that WFL fran-
chises were underfinanced and located mostly in small markets); id. at 1351-52 (noting
managerial decisions by the USFL that caused its failure).
126. While competing with the USFL, NFL games usually drew national ratings of 15
or 16. The USFL's first season games averaged only a 7 rating and dropped to 5.5 by
the second year. Larry Stewart, ABC Seeks to Cut Pay to USFL; Network Is Asking for
Steep Reduction in $15-Million Deal, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 20, 1985, Sports Part 3, at I. The
USFL average attendance per game was 27,272 in 1984, and 24,452 in 1985, while the
NFL drew 59,813 and 59,567 in those seasons, respectively. Dave Goldberg, Will Move to
Fall Bring on the Fall of USFL?, L.A. TIMFS, July 2, 1985, Sports Part 3, at 8; NFL
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Several qualities of the NFL favor its legal recognition as a
natural monopoly. Special characteristics of an industry justify
special legal consideration in the face of antitrust laws.' The
NFL many unique characteristics justify special legal consideration
in antitrust cases. Congress has already recognized this in granting
the NFL special treatment (along with other sports leagues) in the
areas of mergers and television contracts. 2
Finally, no benefits would arise from competition between the
NFL and rival leagues. Costs would increase and fans would not
be able to see all the best players compete against each other.'29
Since no benefits arise from competition, application of antitrust
law to the NFL without acknowledging its status as a natural mo-
nopoly is potentially detrimental to consumers as well as the
league.
C. Anti-Natural Monopoly Arguments
Some commentators have argued that the NFL is not a natural
monopoly. 3 Stephen F. Ross presented the most thorough argu-
ment against finding the NFL to be a natural monopoly. 3' Ross
argues that the NFL, like other sports leagues, is a monopoly but
that it is not a natural monopoly and should therefore be broken
up.'32 However, this Note demonstrates that his arguments oppos-
ing recognition of the NFL as a natural monopoly are not persua-
sive.
R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 350. Other factors, such as the USFL's spring playing dates
and market size disparity between teams of rival leagues, may have contributed to the
NFL's better attendance and TV ratings. However, without a superior product, the NFL
could not maintain its attendance and ratings edge. It has maintained such an edge; there-
fore superior product quality can be inferred. Objective inferences aside, any knowledge-
able football fan who watched the USFL in action would agree that higher quality foot-
ball could be found in the NFL. See, e.g., Tony Komheiser, The USFL: It's Almost For-
gotten, But It Isn't Gone Yet, L.A. TIMES, May 5, 1985, Sports Part 3, at 12.
127. See supra part III.A (identifying the characteristics of a natural monopoly).
128. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994) (allowing certain sports leagues to sign television
deals and share revenue as if they were single entities).
129. See supra notes 92-94 and accompanying text (discussing fans' interests in a com-
petitive contest at the lowest possible cost).
130. E.g., Rosenbaum, supra note 59, at 815-16 (asserting that the idea of a natural
monopoly is an idea not normally applied to sports leagues because they are like all other
forms of entertainment); Ross, supra note 93, at 716-17, 721-23.
131. Ross, supra note 93, at 716-17, 721-23.
132. Id. at 716-17.
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1. Minimum Size
Ross addresses the argument that the minimum size of a
league is too large to support multiple leagues.'33 This argument
says that if the number of cities capable of supporting a team is
small (from six to eight being the minimum number to have a
viable league), only one league is possible.'34 Since the NFL cur-
rently has thirty teams, there are more than enough cities to sup-
port the existence of two leagues under the minimum size analysis;
thus, Ross argues that the NFL cannot be a natural monopoly.
Failure of this argument has no bearing on whether the NFL is a
natural monopoly, however; it merely shows that the NFL has
more teams than absolutely necessary to operate.
2. Cost of Forming a Rival League
Ross next addresses the argument that league expansion costs
less than formation of rival leagues.'35 He discounts this argument
by claiming that no evidence exists indicating that costs for a
second league would be any higher than for a monopoly
league. 36
This is both incorrect and irrelevant. It is incorrect because it
ignores some of the NFL's major assets that could not be pur-
chased by a rival league. No amount of cost expenditure by a new
league can provide it with the intangible assets possessed by the
NFL, which are important to generating fan interest. A new league
cannot purchase rivalries, records, or fan loyalty, which are impor-
tant revenue generating assets of the NFL. While a new league
could generate these over time, the time needed would be an addi-
tional cost making overall costs for a second league higher than
those of an existing monopoly league. Moreover, the assertion is
irrelevant because showing that a rival league could operate at the
same cost as the NFL does not show that the NFL is not a natural
monopoly. Two electric utilities could operate in the exact same
area for the exact same cost. Whether multiple firm operation is in
the consumer's best interest is the key issue in finding the exis-
133. Id. at 716.
134. Id. (noting studies that have found that six to eight teams are needed to have a
league).
135. Id.
136. Id. at 717 (stating that "stadium rental, player salaries, and administrative costs"
would not be higher for a new league than for an existing one).
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tence of a natural monopoly. 137
Ross claims that low costs to the league do not translate into
value to society.13 He supports this by saying that unlike the
case of utilities, monopoly sports leagues do not better serve the
public. This ignores the public's interest in concentration of talent.
He does address the idea that one league can operate at lower
costs than leagues in competition, but claims that the public does
not benefit from lower league costs.'39 He supports this by noting
that the automobile industry could merge into one company and
reduce overall expenses" yet no one would call it a natural mo-
nopoly. 4' This ignores a defining economic characteristic of natu-
ral monopolies that the NFL possesses. The relevant cost that sepa-
rates natural monopolies from other industries is average cost per
unit of output. Overall expenses are not important in defining a
natural monopoly. Any industry would face lower expenses if it
had sufficient market power over suppliers. An increase in output
of cars always requires an increase in raw materials expense. Since
the major cost of each car is raw materials, increasing the number
of cars produced does not reduce the average cost per car. The
NFL's average cost decreases as it increases output (if output is
measured in quantifiable terms such as number of games played),
so it is unlike an automobile manufacturer monopoly."'2
3. The Reason for the Failure of Rival Leagues
Ross claims that the NFL's major rivals failed to survive for
reasons unrelated to the NFL's natural monopoly position. 43 The
AAFC failed because complete domination by the Cleveland
Browns resulted in lack of fan interest. But this is merely another
way of saying the NFL had a superior product, which courts have
recognized as a legitimate means of acquiring a monopoly.'" The
suggestion that the league failed because one team dominated for a
period of four years is not supported by examples from other
sports. The Boston Celtics, New York Yankees, and Montreal
137. See supra part III.A.1 (discussing the economic definition and characteristics of
natural monopolies).
138. Ross, supra note 93, at 716.
139. Id. at 717.
140. This could be done by suppressing wages and obtaining favorable input prices.
141. Ross, supra note 93, at 717.
142. See supra part III.A.1 (discussing the economics of natural monopolies).
143. Ross, supra note 93, at 721-22.
144. See supra notes 41-42 (giving cases that discuss superior product and intelligence).
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Canadians each dominated their leagues for periods greater than
four years, yet their respective leagues managed to survive.145
4. Serving Public Interest with Multiple Leagues
Two arguments supporting the proposition that one league is
in the public's best interest are that only a single league can pro-
duce a champion and assure the competitive balance necessary for
exciting contests.' Ross counters the championship game argu-
ment by saying that rival leagues could agree to a championship
game and interleague play.4 He counters the competitive balance
argument by saying that leagues could agree with the players'
union about how to allocate players." These results in fact hap-
pened in the NFL-AFL merger, which resulted in a single, larger
league. 49 Rival leagues that play each other-necessitating a
commonly arrived at schedule and common rules-and that have
agreements about player allocations would not in fact be distinct
leagues.
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE NFL BEING A NATURAL MONOPOLY:
NEED FOR ALTERNATE REGULATION
Inapplicability of the Sherman Act to natural monopolies has
forced courts to consider the special nature of natural monopolies
when considering antitrust attacks.5 ' It has also required alternate
145. Teams in other sports exhibited dominance equal to that of the Browns in the
AAFC without threatening the existence of their leagues. The New York Yankees ruled
Major League Baseball from 1936 to 1943, winning seven pennants and six World Series,
and again from 1949 to 1965, winning 14 pennants in those 16 years and adding nine
World Series victories, including five straight from 1949 to 1953. THE SPORTING NEWS,
GREATEST SPORTS DYNASTIES 13 (Joe Hoppel et al. eds., 1989). The Boston Celtics cap-
tured 11 NBA crowns over 13 seasons from 1956 to 1969, including a seemingly
unmatchable eight consecutive titles without destroying the NBA, which at the time was
not widely popular. Id. at 54. The Montreal Canadiens dominated the NHL from 1956 to
1979, appearing in 19 of 25 Stanley Cup finals in that stretch and winning 15 of them,
yet the league managed to continue. Id. at 154-55, 395. Even within the NFL, the Green
Bay Packers, Pittsburgh Steelers, and San Francisco Forty-Niners have enjoyed periods of
dominance close to that displayed by the AAFC Cleveland Browns without threatening the
existence of the league. See NFL R&F BOOK, supra note 5, at 269-75.
146. Ross, supra note 93, at 723.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. For a brief discussion of the details of the AFL-NFL merger, see HARRIs, supra
note 117, at 62-63, 65-66.
150. See supra part mI.A.2 (discussing the legal definition and characteristics of natural
monopolies).
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regulation in many situations."' Finding the NFL to be a natural
monopoly would not only require that courts give special consider-
ation to its status when it is attacked based on the Sherman Act, it
would also justify alternate regulation that would be more applica-
ble to the NFL's unique circumstances.
A. The Extent of the Sherman Act's Applicability to a
Natural Monopoly in the NFL
Since the NFL is a natural monopoly, its status as a monopoly
is not a violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Shutting out
competitors through natural process is not a restraint of trade.'52
The size of the NFL's market share, however that market is de-
fined, should not in itself open the league to any antitrust attack,
though the court may infer monopoly power solely from market
share.'53 The only way the NFL could be liable under the
Sherman Act is if it engaged in activity intended to unlawfully
prevent another firm from trying to compete for the NFL's natural
monopoly.'54
B. Alternate Regulation of the NFL
Even as a natural monopoly, the NFL is still prohibited from
using its power to restrict rivals from competing for its monopo-
ly.' Otherwise, antitrust law is inapplicable to a natural monopo-
ly. This does not mean the NFL should be free from regula-
tion." 6 Regulation apart from standard antitrust law is the com-
151. See S.S.W., Inc. v. Air Transport Ass'n of Am., 191 F.2d 658, 661 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 343 U.S. 955 (1952) (stating that application of antitrust laws is limited in
cases of regulated industries).
152. Lamb Enters., Inc. v. Toledo Blade Co., 461 F.2d 506, 515 (6th Cir. 1972) (stat-
ing that foreclosing competitors from the market is not unreasonable when it is "the natu-
ral result of success in a natural monopoly situation").
153. Size of market share alone is not a violation of Section 2, but courts have found
that a large enough market share creates situations in which monopoly power must exist,
so size alone is in actuality a violation of Section 2. See, e.g., United States v. Griffith,
334 U.S. 100, 107 (1948) ("[M]onopoly power . . . may itself constitute an evil and
stand condemned under § 2 even though it remains unexercised.").
154. See Omega Satellite Prods. Co. v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119, 127 (7th
Cir. 1982) ("If the most efficient method of determining which firm should have the
natural monopoly is a competitive process that will inevitably destroy the other firms, the
antitrust laws presumably would forbid interference with that process.").
155. See id. (stating that interference with the natural, though destructive, competition
for a natural monopoly would be an antitrust violation).
156. Professor Gary R. Roberts, Professor of Law and Sports Law Program Director at
Tulane Law School, in hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, argued for a
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mon response to natural monopoly situations. 7 Such regulation is
created to protect public interests, because antitrust law cannot do
so in natural monopolies.'58
Consideration of special regulation of certain aspects of the
National Football League is not new. Congress's antitrust exemp-
tions for mergers and television contracts'59 are clear examples of
special regulation of the NFL. Several Senators have offered pro-
posals for regulating team movement."W One commentator has
suggested that Congress step in and forcibly break up the NFL's
monopoly.' Determining what regulation is appropriate requires
consideration of the goals and ideal characteristics of such regula-
tion.
1. The Scope and Goal of Regulation
Any regulation of the NFL should be broad enough to cover
every aspect of league activity. Piece-meal regulation through spe-
cific congressional acts, 2 Senate proposals dealing with only one
issue facing the league,'63 and court decisions applicable only to
limited antitrust exemption in cases of franchise relocation and ownership restrictions be-
cause he sees alternate regulation as not politically feasible. On the Application of Federal
Antitrust Law to Professional Sports Team Franchise Relocations, 1995: Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition of the Senate Judiciary
Comm., 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (Nov. 29, 1995) (testimony of Professor Roberts), available
in LEXIS, Legis Library, CNGTST File. He states that in such cases, public interest will
best be served by letting the league make decisions free from antitrust constraints. Id.
This Note agrees that owners' and fans' interests will often align. See infra part IV.B.2.
However, this will not always be the case, and having the fox guard the hen house is
not the answer. Since antitrust regulation of sports leagues is not a particularly partisan
issue, altemate regulation in this area may be more practically feasible than in many other
areas in which Congress involves itself.
157. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345 (D. Mass.
1953) ("[I]t is for Congress to decide what conditions, and subject to what regulations,
such a monopoly shall conduct its business."), affd, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
158. "If competition is inappropriate, regulated monopolies should be established to
avoid possible abuses of uncontrolled monopoly power." MCCONNELL & BRUE, supra note
44, at 373 (emphasis in original).
159. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994). This statute also refers to other sports leagues. See
id.
160. See Charles Gray, Note, Keeping the Home Team at Home, 74 CAL. L. REV.
1329, 1362-67 (1986) for a discussion of proposed NFL franchise relocation bills. The
specifics of the bills vary, but they involve setting objective standards that a franchise
must meet before it can relocate. Id. More bills have been proposed in the wake of the
Browns' move. See, e.g., S. 1625, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (exempting from antitrust
laws a professional sports league's enforcement of its own relocation rules).
161. Ross, supra note 93, at 748.
162. See 15 U.S.C. § 1291 (1994).
163. See Gray, supra note 160, at 1362-67.
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specific fact patterns,164 have produced the current system, which
offers no clear conclusions on how the NFL's activity will be
viewed under the law. The NFL's inability to gauge how it will be
treated under the law contributed to the unchallenged abandonment
of Baltimore by the now Indianapolis Colts and allowed Modell to
move his franchise from Cleveland to Baltimore because he knew
the league could not easily prevent his move. 65
Since the purpose of regulating the league is to protect public
interests, any system of regulation must serve those interests. 66
The inability of antitrust law to serve those interests is a major
reason why alternate regulation is necessary. The interests of con-
sumers, in this case the fans, must be at the heart of the regula-
tion.
2. The Role of League Members in Regulation
New regulation must give some deference to league members.
Consumer interest must be the focus, but three justifications sup-
port giving league members some input into any regulatory mecha-
nism.
Regulation should not infringe on private property rights of
the league members. 67  Because the government is not in the
business of running a football league, it should only interfere with
league decisions if needed to protect consumer interests.
Some deference is appropriate because league interests and
consumer interests will tend to align on some issues. 168  The
league generates revenue from fan interest. 69 Because the league
164. See, e.g., USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988); Los Angeles Memorial
Coliseum Comm'n v. NFL, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
165. The NFL's state of confusion regarding antitrust laws was the reason why the
league took no legal action when the Colts moved to Indianapolis at the end of the 1983
season. Phil Elderkin, Rozelle Calls for Guidelines as to Where the NFL Fits in Anti-trust
Laws, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 21, 1985, Sports, at 20. "NFL commissioner Paul
Tagliabue told the [Senate Judiciary] committee Wednesday that team owners are unwill-
ing to oppose the moves and risk legal action again after the Oakland Raiders successful-
ly sued the league to move to Los Angeles in 1982." Bruce Alpert, Sports Law Expert:
Regulate NFL, TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Nov. 30, 1995, at DI.
166. See supra part II.B (discussing the purpose of antitrust law).
167. See Gray, supra note 160, at 1361 (discussing protection of team owners' property
rights as a problem with which franchise relocation legislation must deal).
168. Fan and league interests will clash in many cases, such as broadcasting of games
solely on pay television, but if fan and league interests aligned perfectly, regulation would
be unnecessary.
169. See supra part I.C; see also, Gray, supra note 160, at 1365 (stating that
"[g]enerally, the leagues' interests have matched the public's interests" in the area of
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will make decisions that will increase its revenue, and that revenue
is generated from fan interest, the league will tend to make deci-
sions that it thinks will enhance fan interest, thus league and fan
interests will tend to align. For example, if the league could en-
force its own rules, it would not allow movement of a franchise
with strong fan support (as measured by television ratings) because
it would not want to jeopardize the income generated from that
support. The league would not create player allocation rules that
allow certain teams, such as larger market teams, to dominate
because its members know that fans want to see competitive con-
tests.
Finally, some deference is desirable because the league mem-
bers are best suited to manage league affairs because of their expe-
rience with the unique situation of the NFL 70 Regulation by par-
ties who do not understand the issues facing the league and its
fans will not be able to make informed decisions. Because they are
the parties with the most knowledge about their own operations,
league members should have some input into the regulatory mecha-
nism.
3. Reducing Litigation Costs Through Regulation
Any new regulation of the NFL should try to minimize costs
associated with the current practice of applying antitrust law to the
NFL. 7' The confusion caused by the lack of applicability and
lack of consensus of current regulation creates litigation costs as
each issue is taken to trial repeatedly.' New regulation that is
directly applicable to issues facing the league and that allows de-
velopment of guidelines that can direct future league action will
reduce the costs of repeated litigation.
franchise relocation).
170. See Gray, supra note 160, at 1361 (stating that franchise location regulation should
recognize that sports leagues are best able to manage their operations).
171. "Minimizing the cost of administration of social enterprises . . . is a well estab-
lished and independent societal goal." Robert A. Baruch Bush, Dispute Resolution Alterna-
tives and the Goals of Civil Justice: Jurisdictional Principles for Process Choice, 1984
Wis. L. REv. 893, 920 (1984) (discussing societal goals of legal systems).
172. See, e.g., supra notes 69, 73 (citing many cases that have tried to resolve the
single entity issue).
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C. Suggested New Regulation
The NFL must be statutorily removed from the full scope of
antitrust law. '73 Legislation should indicate that Section 2 of the
Sherman Act is only applicable to the NFL if the activity in ques-
tion is allegedly a restraint of trade done with the intention of
unfairly preventing a rival league from competing for the NFL's
natural monopoly.174 The NFL would of course be subject to all
non-antitrust laws, such as labor laws and discrimination laws,
because the NFL's unique characteristics are not a hindrance to
their normal application.
An arbitration board should replace courts and current antitrust
law in regulating the rest of the league's activities. The board
should be made up of both league representatives and non-league
representatives. The NFL may select one-fourth of the board mem-
bers by any means the league chooses. This would produce a
board that is somewhat deferential to the NFL. Selection of the
non-league members could be through any reasonable selection
method, such as congressional appointment. Non-league members
should be selected based on substantial familiarity with the NFL
and lack of incentive to subordinate the interests of fans to those
of the league. Possible non-league members could be members of
the media, former players, or even outsiders who display sufficient
understanding of issues facing the NFL and its fans. A majority
vote should be required to reach decisions so the league representa-
tives cannot dominate; they must get the votes of over one-third of
the non-league members.
Challenges to league actions would be heard by the board.
The board may offer advisory opinions but will only directly rule
on activities that are challenged. A preliminary inquiry will be
made to see if the challenge has merit. If so, it will be considered
by the board.
173. See National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 689
(1978) (stating that the task of exempting industries from antitrust regulation is left to
Congress).
Statutory exemption already exists for the NFL to a limited extent through 15 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1994), which exempts agreements of NFL sports telecasts from antitrust laws.
Other industries also have statutory exemptions. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 221 (1994) (ex-
empting telephone and telegraph companies from the full scope of antitrust law and plac-
ing them under FCC regulation).
174. See supra notes 152, 154-55 and accompanying text (noting that shutting out com-
petitors through a natural process is not a restraint of trade).
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Exactly what actions may be challenged must be spelled out.
The areas of activity most likely to involve the league acting to
fans' detriment are in player movement, franchise movement,
broadcast of games, and number of games. Only actions dealing
with these issues could be considered. Playing rules and allocation
of league profits are examples of areas in which the league's ac-
tions could not be challenged under the arbitration board.
Guidelines by which the board can judge league actions are
necessary. The basic guideline is that the league cannot take ac-
tions that are contrary to fan interest. Fan interest should be de-
fined as the interest of the average fan in watching games involv-
ing the best players available either in person or on television
without facing unreasonable restrictions or costs.'" The board
could develop, and would develop as actions are challenged, a list
of what specific actions will be found to be against fan interest.
This will provide the NFL with a source of guidance so confusion
about what actions are permitted will be minimized. This will
result in reduction in costs because the league will know before-
hand if actions are permissible, making much litigation unneces-
sary.
Decisions of the board may be subject to judicial review, but
such review should be limited. Subjecting the decisions to full
judicial review would merely add a layer to the current system in
which courts rule on issues under antitrust law.'76
Review similar to that allowed in labor arbitration contract
situations may be desirable.'" Decisions could be reviewed if a
dispute arises over whether the board is basing its decisions on the
established guidelines. While the board's opinion of how guidelines
apply to particular actions by the NFL would not be reviewable,
decisions would face judicial review to determine if in fact the
board based its decisions on those guidelines.' Thus, decisions
175. As with many legal definitions, this one is somewhat vague but necessarily so to
enable it to cover many possible fact situations.
176. See Gray, supra note 160, at 1366-67 (stating that judicial review "would take the
teeth out of" proposed relocation regulation that provides objective standards for relocation
for the purpose of avoiding litigation).
177. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597
(1960) (stating that courts must refuse enforcement of an arbitration award if the award
does not "draw its essence" from the arbitration agreement).
178. See id. at 598 (reversing the circuit court's refusal to enforce an arbitration deci-
sion because the circuit court's refusal was not based on the arbitrator's failure to premise
the award on his construction of the contract, but because the court disagreed with the
arbitrator's construction).
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could be judicially challenged on the grounds that the board did
not follow the fan interest guideline in reaching them but the
board's opinion of what the fans' interests are could not be chal-
lenged.
D. Practical Results of Recognizing the NFL as a Natural
Monopoly and Developing Alternate Regulation
Looking at two recent cases involving the NFL shows the
practical results of finding the NFL to be a natural monopoly and
regulating it through non-antitrust means.
1. The USFL Case
If the court had acknowledged the NFL's natural monopoly in
the USFL case,'79 the rival league would not have won even its
nominal judgment. In that case, "the jury found that the NFL had
willfully acquired or maintained monopoly power" and that its
"unlawful monopolization of professional football had injured the
USFL."'8 ° If the court had recognized the NFL's natural monopo-
ly, it could not have been in violation of antitrust law without a
showing that it unlawfully used its monopoly power to prevent
competition by the USFL, a claim that the jury specifically reject-
ed. "' Even though the USFL won only nominal damages, the
NFL did lose on the USFL's claim that it was a monopoly. 2
This leaves the NFL open to further attacks based solely on the
fact that it is a monopoly. The USFL's victory also allowed it to
recover attorney fees under Section 4 of the Clayton Act. 3
While the $5.5 million award was significantly less than the $440
million in damages claimed by the USFL, it was money that the
NFL should not have been forced to pay."'
179. USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d 1335 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071 (1990).
180. Id. at 1341.
181. Id. The jury found that "the NFL did not commit any overt act in furtherance of a
conspiracy to monopolize; that the NFL did not engage in a conspiracy in restraint of
trade." Id.
182. Id.
183. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1994); USFL v. NFL, 887 F.2d 408, 411 (2d Cir. 1988).
184. 887 F.2d at 411 (listing attorney fees awarded); USFL v. NFL, 842 F.2d at 1341
n.3 (listing damages sought by USFL).
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2. The Los Angeles Coliseum Commission Case
The Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Commission v. NFL'85
opinions provide a clear example of a situation in which antitrust
application to the NFL ignored, and arguably went against, con-
sumer interest. Alternate regulation taking fan interests into account
should prevent similar decisions in the future.
In the late 1970s, the Los Angeles Rams changed their home
field from the Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum to Anaheim Stadi-
um. 86 The Coliseum Commission wanted to attract another NFL
team but saw as an obstacle the league rule requiring three-fourths
of the NFL's teams to approve a franchise relocation to an area
within seventy-five miles of another franchise (in this case the
Rams). "'87 The Commission filed suit against the NFL, claiming
that the rule was a restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of
the Sherman Act.'88 The court dismissed the initial case, but gave
the Commission leave to amend its complaint to clarify its
claims.'89
By the second trial, the Commission had reached an agree-
ment that would bring the Raiders from Oakland. The Commission
premised its claim on the effect that the NFL's rule had on its
efforts to complete a deal with the Raiders."9 In considering the
NFL's rule under a rule of reason test, the court said that it had to
balance the NFL's interests with the interests of individual
teams. '9 The court concluded that a rule requiring a majority of
teams to approve franchise movement would adequately serve
league interests and that the three-fourths rule was over-restrictive
and thus a restraint of trade.'92 The court did not consider the
interests of consumers, which are supposed to be the basis for
antitrust law. In aff'rming, the circuit court mentioned the impor-
tance of "[flan loyalty and location continuity" in considering relo-
cation. It stated that "[s]ome sort of procedural mechanism" may
185. 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984), aff g 484 F. Supp. 1274 (C.D. Cal. 1980), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 990 (1984).
186. Id. at 1384.
187. Id. at 1384-85.
188. Id. at 1385.
189. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 484 F. Supp. at 1275.
190. Id.
191. Id. at 1277.
192. Id.
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be necessary to take those factors into account. 9 3 However, the
circuit court affirmed the decision that did not take fan interest into
account, saying that "[tlo the extent the NFL finds the law inade-
quate, it must look to Congress for relief.'19 4 If an alternate regu-
latory system is created, the interests of the fans will not be ig-
nored as they were when the Raiders left Oakland.
3. The Cleveland Browns Move
Nothing in NFL history has demonstrated the desperate need
for coherent antitrust regulation incorporating consumer concerns
like the move of Modell's franchise to Baltimore. The move of the
Cleveland Browns, historically one of the NFL's most successful
franchises 9 ' and a fixture in Cleveland for forty-six years, met
with widespread public outcry.'96 Commissioner Paul Tagliabue
told the Senate Judiciary Committee, during the rash of Capitol
Hill activity following the announced move, that NFL owners were
unwilling to block the move for fear of losing an antitrust suit as
they did against the Raiders.'97 While fan upheaval compelled the
NFL to reach a special agreement with Modell and the city of
Cleveland,'98 the underlying problem was not addressed. Issues of
public interest will continue to come up each time a franchise
moves or each time the league is faced with another issue that,
because of the NFL's unique position as a natural monopoly, is of
great interest to consumers but over which they have no voice,
economic or otherwise. The alternate regulation suggested in this
Note should guarantee that a travesty the likes of which Cleveland
has had to endure will no longer be possible.
193. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at 1397.
194. Id. at 1401.
195. The Browns have made the post season in 23 of their 46 seasons, tying the fran-
chise with the New York Giants for the highest number of years with a post season
appearance among all NFL teams. The franchise is in one of the top five NFL teams in
terms of percentage of seasons ending in a post season appearance. See BROWNS MEDIA
GUIDE, supra note 13, at 168.
196. See Rushin, supra note 3, at 60.
197. Alpert, supra note 165, at D1.
198. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing fan outrage at the move).
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V. CONCLUSION
Application of antitrust law to the National Football League has
been fraught with difficulty and confusion. The NFL's characteris-
tics make it a natural monopoly and therefore put it beyond the
scope of standard antitrust law. Instead of trying to contort existing
law so that it can deal with the NFL, the government should create
new regulation applicable to the National Football League, regula-
tion that will serve the consumer interest goal of antitrust law.
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